And social sciences have, at times, suffered from the need to be as exact as the natural sciences; to derive their laws. The father of sociology, Auguste Comte, aimed to turn sociology into "social physics," but this endeavor has always been futile. Admittedly, from Marxism reduced and vulgarized to dialectical materialism, an ideological system of "historical regularities" was created, allowing communists to legitimize their monopoly and unchanging authority based on that construction. This persisted until dialectical materialism was blown away and swept aside by (neo)liberalism, which also attempted to establish historical regularity or axiomatic superiority. However, even though there are no inconsistencies in society and thus no determinism, it does not mean that certain generalizations and empirical associations cannot be reached in the realm of society and social sciences.

For example, "Orlovic′s Law" (as I refer to it) entails the conclusion of Slavisa Orlovic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He states that a change of power in Serbia can only occur if two conditions are met: First, most Serbian citizens desire a change of control, and second, a foreign factor also desires a change of power. If only one of these two conditions is fulfilled, it is insufficient for changes to occur. Both conditions must be met, as was the case in the pivotal years of Serbias recent political history - 2000 and 2012.

Although it is not and cannot be a law, for instance, the assertion that a state without political emigration and with foreigners coming to work in it is unlikely to be a true dictatorship holds sufficient generalization and sustainability.

Another modest contribution of ours to the consideration of a political regularity resembling determinism is that in any somewhat multiparty system, for the system to have democratic optimality, the leading opposition party must be more extensive and more robust than the essential coalition partner of the dominant ruling party (if a coalition is in power). For example, if the Christian Democrats (CDU) are in control in Germany in coalition with the Free Democrats (FDP), the Social Democrats (SPD), as the strongest opposition party, are more robust than the Free Democrats but weaker than the Christian Democrats. Or vice versa. If the SPD is in power in coalition with the Greens, then the CDU, the leading opposition party, is stronger than the Greens. This regularity does not apply when the German phenomenon is at play - a grand coalition ("elephant wedding") of the Christian Democrats and Social Democrats.

As for the Serbian reality, if the political system were non-hybrid, the leading opposition party would be stronger than the Socialist Party of Serbia and even more robust than PUPS or the Social Democratic Party of Serbia led by Rasim Ljajic. At the same time, quite logically, this leading opposition party would be weaker than the strongest ruling party - the Serbian Progressive Party. Ratings of opposition entities - parties, movements, and initiatives - are meager, mainly at the risk of not meeting the electoral threshold. Meanwhile, the anti-Vucic sentiment is significant, even possibly the majority sentiment in some areas like Belgrade, as public opinion surveys indicate. This paradoxical situation presents the chronic fragmentation of the opposition as an ontological handicap, even a fate.

Before the last elections in April of last year, the strongest opposition party was the Party of Freedom and Justice, led by Dragan Djilas. However, infrastructure-wise, it was weaker than the Socialist Party of Serbia. Today, the situation is even more paradoxical - anti-Vucic sentiment has grown, and the rating of the Serbian Progressive Party is stagnating or relatively decreasing, mainly held up by Vucics charisma and authority. At the same time, the opposition parties have not improved their ratings. On the contrary, instead of consolidating the scene, further fragmentation is occurring. Not only is the Serbian Progressive Party currently much more robust than any individual opposition party, but it is also more robust (primarily infrastructure-wise) than the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (PUPS) in relation to each opposition party.

The average citizen (potential voter) in Serbia quickly establishes a connection between the leaders and the parties in power: Vucic - SNS, Dacic - SPS, and Krkobabic - PUPS; only Rasim Ljajic is more recognizable than his party. Everyone knows Rasim, but not everyone knows that they are precisely the social democrats; not everyone would even be able to explain the difference between Rasim Ljajics social democracy and Boris Tadics social democracy.

Vucic has managed to create a synergistic coalition effect that the opposition lacks. PUPS is a typical example of a coalition partner whose principles have been adopted by Vucic. PUPS has a recognizable program, consistent actions, party identification, and one of the more successful slogans - "Penzije prate plate" (Pensions keep pace with salaries), which was established by the partys first president, Jovan Krkobabic, and is also emphasized by his successor in the party, his son and the current president of PUPS, Milan Krkobabic, with an exciting twist. Milan Krkobabic is the Minister of Rural Welfare, and due to the success of an appealing program for the purchase and renovation of rural houses with state support, public opinion surveys show that a significant portion of the citizens recognizes Krkobabic as the Minister of Agriculture. This occurred both when the actual Minister of Agriculture was Branislav Nedimovic and now with Jelena Tanaskovic in that role.

In the opposition, connecting the leaders name with the party they are supposed to personify is much more complicated. In my village, people still think that Tadic is the president of the Democratic Party. And even though, thanks to the regimes particularly negative propaganda, Dragan Djilas, Zdravko Ponos, or Vuk Jeremic are quite well-known figures when facing the pressure at Zeka Millionaires hot seat (famous Serbian TV quiz host), many would lose much money if, at the final question, they had to match a politicians name with the party they lead.

Of course, the strength of ruling political parties also arises from the availability of state resources, the alignment of governing parties with the state, and the inclination of the nation to support those in power. Well, Vucic was obsessed with getting back at the October 5th movement by dismantling the parties of that narrative. Still, all of this is not an excuse for the tragic fragmentation of the opposition. Someone might say, "But it was like that before the Fifth of October." Well, it wasnt quite the same, and the multitude of parties within DOS (The Democratic Opposition of Serbia) is a particular illusion. Although Vuk Draskovic practically founded DOS, the strongest opposition party at the time - SPO - was not part of DOS during the pivotal moments. However, the splinter faction led by Velimir Ilic, which gave rise to "Nova Srbija" (The New Serbia), was that essential component of DOS. This provided DOS with a stronger sense of united action.

The most significant party within DOS was DS (The Democratic Party) (most leaders from the smaller DOS parties were aligned with Djindjic). Besides "Nova Srbija,” it was also DSS (The Democratic Party of Serbia) due to the presidential candidate Vojislav Kostunica. Nebojsa Covic (The Democratic Alternative) also held a certain weight as a former prominent member and technocrat of SPS (The Socialist Party of Serbia) (Mayor of Belgrade). During the major split between Djindjic and Kostunica after the fall of Milosevic, there were significant party reconfigurations. For example, when Slobodan Vuksanovic (close to Kostunica) attempted to take over the Movement for Democratic Serbia from Momcilo Perisic (close to Djindjic). Since that operation didnt succeed, Vuksanovic, along with his associates, founded the Peoples Democratic Party, which aligned with Kostunica.

What Nebojsa Covic and Aleksandar Tijanic have in common is that both of them were so-called "safety valves." Covic served as the Mayor of Belgrade, while Tijanic was the Minister of Information in the government of Mirko Marjanovic. Despite being one of the most prominent members of the SPS, Covic refused to accept the electoral fraud during the local elections in 1996. Tijanic did the same, even though he had previously referred to Milosevic as the Bengal Tiger in his columns in the weekly newspaper "Evropljanin" (The European Citizen), which probably wouldnt occur to even the most creative sycophants who cultivate the cult of Vucic going so far as to portray their leader as a wolf that sleeps little and fights against hyenas. However, the tiger, especially a Bengal one, was never achieved. Simply put, both Covic and Tijanic had their red lines, as its popularly said today. Thats why they were "safety valves." When they stepped out of the system at that time, things became even more exposed.

In todays context, although the cause of the crisis wasnt electoral fraud, the only democratic "safety valve" who stepped out at the right time was the Minister of Economy, Rade Basta. His European path now appears in public opinion polls as a pro-European opposition option. The opposition shouldnt be too critical of prominent figures coming from the ranks of the government, just as Djindjic wasnt. Of course, its unrealistic to expect Nebojsa Covic in this format to become what he once was. Still, it’s instructive that Covic personally confronted the hypocrisy of the West regarding democratic authorities in Serbia, particularly concerning Kosovo. Its important not to forget that immediately after the October 5th movement, the new democratic authorities had to deal with an armed Albanian uprising in southern Serbia.

Demostat categorizes political parties in Serbia into three groups: Parties in power, right-wing parties, and center-left parties. Pay attention! There is no center-right. Because the right wing, for now, can be partly against Vucic but is not pro-EU and the West. Rade Basta and Miroslav Aleksic have a chance to reverse this trend.

Logically, people with an authoritarian mindset are more inclined toward authoritarian political leaders. Vucic skillfully exploits this aspect of the prevailing political mentality in Serbia. Hence, his media-induced omnipresence is a part of the machinery of power. However, just as the idolization of a political leader often leads to the erosion of democracy, the other extreme, commonly popularized in the shape of a stereotype here, is not normal either. How often have you heard someone say they would like to live in a Scandinavian country where ordinary citizens dont know who the president, prime minister, or ministers are? This sentiment often extends to non-Scandinavian countries with a good standard of living. Even in places like France, where people may know that Macron is the president, they might not know who the ministers are. I havent met a decent person in Scandinavian or other countries that these stereotypes typically refer to, who doesnt know who their head of state is, who their prime minister is, who the key ministers are, let alone not knowing their relevant ministers. Although Ive encountered people in the US who mix up Slovakia and Slovenia, even here, not everyone has a clear idea of where Montana and Oregon are. So, its silly to expect Serbia to be a civil utopia with anonymous politicians, like the "boring country" Kostunica promised us after the October 5th movement.

Even though proponents of the civic option in Serbia are less authoritarian (but only less, not non-authoritarian), without responsible and popular leadership, their option also has little to hope for in a clash with Vucic. Isnt it illogical that "Pokret slobodnih gradjana" (The Movement of Free Citizens) didnt emerge as the most potent political option in Serbia after the massive civic protests following two massacres?

Demostat has found that focus groups indicate a growing awareness that non-party protests cant achieve much. Antipartisanship is a modern form of anarchism. Parties are expected to "not mess this up," as one professor put it during the protests, as if parties are merely tools for fulfilling the demands of non-partisan individuals and as if party members arent citizens themselves. However, parties also need to try to represent various social strata. The dwindling of the protests doesnt necessarily mean the number of those against Vucic has decreased. Still, suppose that number rises again (significantly if the protests acquire a social dimension due to rising costs, which they lack for now). In that case, the old and exhausting dilemmas of the opposition will resurface: civil or partisan. At its most absurd, this comparison resembles the dilemmas parents face with their children in school: Religious education or civil upbringing? As if these are inherently confrontational or inherently irreconcilable. Its a burdening imposed nonsense.

In its May survey, Demostat found that a majority of citizens negatively assess the governments performance in terms of the economy, indicating dissatisfaction with their personal standard of living. However, many believe that the governments performance is average, and this perceived averageness continues to provide stability for Vucic.

Its almost as if theres an unspoken consensus between Vucic and the protesting citizens and the opposition on the other side that we dont need multi-partyism, except that the opposition desires a different type of one-party system than Vucics – a version in the form of clientelist populist national unity and statism. Its as if the opposition wants either a consolidated estate-based system with a tinge of Putinism or if non-partisan citizens want a civic non-partisan pluralism as a modification of the Kardelj-style pluralism of self-managed interests. Without strong parties, all protests and their demands are threatened by what Zoran Stojiljkovic, a professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, calls inherent tragedy. If existing parties dont lead the protests, new ones will lead them tomorrow.

The paradox of the 1990s compared to today is that despite a vastly worse social situation back then, politics as an activity was conducted more seriously. Parties were more distinct, there were fewer of them, and central committees, for instance, held some significance. Intellectuals were quite involved in or aligned with parties, and students were also connected to parties. The culture of division in Serbia since 1990 and the introduction of multi-partyism is sadly impressive. Yet, the socialists and radicals managed the schism better, and there were comparably fewer of them.

If we abstract from Tomislav Nikolics attempt to emancipate from Seselj and the support for the Stabilization and Association Agreement (signed between Serbia and the EU in 2008), through which Tadic gained a two-thirds European consensus and the pacification of the radicals, Vucics politics, from this perspective, can be seen as a skillful gradual reunification with the radicals. Its about finding a sustainable model for the radical party in this era. Thats why Seselj, an informal political patriarch of Serbia, sometimes turns a blind eye to Vucics actions and isnt as rigorous regarding his flirtation with the West. From the beginning, the Progressives (SNS) had a solid foundation to build their party infrastructure within the committees of the Serbian Radical Party, as its parts, and often entire committees, transitioned to the Progressives when the SNS was formed in 2008. The pool of people in Serbia willing to engage in politics, particularly in opposition under such conditions of harassment, is limited. Once you eliminate the unserious ones, there are even fewer. Thats why schisms and the creation of new parties are risky. Even in the 1990s, when parties were popular, it wasnt easy. Goran Vesic told me how much effort it took for him and Djindjic to reestablish a local district committee of the DS (The Democratic Party) in Belgrade that had wholly joined Kostunicas DSS (The Democratic Party of Serbia) during the split in 1992.

Its unsustainable to speak of Serbian parties from 1990 as continuations of the pre-communist ones. Dragoljub Micunovic told me that when the DS (The Democratic Party) was founded, it was an entirely new party, not a continuation of the pre-war Democratic Party led by Ljubomir Davidovic, who succeeded by Milan Grol after his death. Seseljs Radicals are not exactly a direct continuation of Nikola Pasics party, nor are Dacics Socialists direct successors of Dimitrije Tucovic and Josip Broz Tito. Just as finding a free domain name on the internet is difficult due to much being taken, its not easy to find an available party name in Serbia, as so many terms like "narodni" (national), "demokratski" (democratic), "srpski" (Serbian), "socijaldemokratski" (social-democratic), "slobodarski" (liberal), "zeleni" (green), "crni" (black), "crveni" (red), and "pravde" (justice) have already been used in party names. The name "Pravda" (justice) without "slobode" (freedom) was the name of the party led by lawyer Borivoje Borovic. The Progressives (SNS) was a well-chosen name for a new political option - not only to contrast with Seseljs Radicals but also to gain historical associations. The Serbian Progressive Party was one of the four most important political parties in Serbia before World War I. It was founded in January 1881 by a group of young conservatives gathered around the Videlo newspaper. Its leaders were Milan Pirocanac, Milutin Garasanin, Stojan Novakovic, and Cedomilj Mijatovic. This SNS came to power with the support of Prince Milan Obrenovic and implemented liberal reforms, convinced that this was the only way to absolute independence and progress for Serbia. They seemed (with the liberal reforms) to be on the same path as both Tomislav Nikolic’s and Vucics Progressives. If they wanted to follow in the footsteps of the historical Progressives and maintain continuity, the SNS with Vucic would have become a major LDP (The Liberal Democratic Party). Instead, LDP cadres scattered across the neo-radical hybrid regime and merged with members of the JUL (Yugoslav United Left) party. Anyhow, Nikola Selakovic mentioned Stojan Novakovic on few occasions on behalf of the party.

Vucic did indeed recall Stojan Novakovic when it was politically advantageous for him to do so. For instance, in July 2020, he emphasized that since the Congress of Berlin, countries have been working to disintegrate Serbia and the Serbian national core, aiding all sides opposing the Serbs. "If we look at the historical events weve gone through, apart from a few wrong moves, like King Milans unnecessary attack on Bulgaria at one point, they were mostly or largely liberation wars," Vucic emphasized. He then reminded us that we must not forget that Serbia didnt even have a conflict or war during the Annexation Crisis, where, as Vucic mentioned, the wisdom of Stojan Novakovic saved us, even though Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina unlawfully. Vucic also recalled Stojan Novakovic in October 2022, quoting him: "There should be no Russophiles or Austrophiles in Serbia, only Serbs who are guided by the interests of the homeland."

The issue of naming the new organization must have posed a challenge for Miroslav Aleksic as he left "Narodna Stranka" (The Peoples Party). Somewhat bizarrely, he decided to symbolically reclaim the name of his "Narodni Pokret Srbije" (The Peoples Movement of Serbia) with the support of his party delegates at Oplenac. This is the same name he re-registered as the Narodna Stranka in cooperation with Vuk Jeremic six years ago. It remains to be seen if Vucic would now find it awkward if he were to include the words "pokret" (movement) and "narod" (people) in the name of his cross-party organization, should he choose to create one in September. In any case, Aleksic asserts that his goal, as it was six years ago, is a united opposition. The split and the formation (or reformation) of this movement will only make sense if the unification occurs around pro-European, pro-Western positions, from which Vuk Jeremic has somewhat distanced himself. Aleksic intends to collect ten thousand verified signatures to officially establish a party, a path similar to that Zdravko Ponos took after his candidacy for the presidency of Serbia and his departure from the Narodna Stranka. Apparently, Ponoss "Srce" (The Heart) was not programmatically and personnel-wise broad enough for Aleksic and his supporters.

Its unfortunate that a series of splits occurred within the Narodna Stranka, especially considering that its structure indeed resembled a political party and therefore stood out from most opposition entities.

Expecting long-term cooperation from Vuk Jeremic and Miroslav Aleksic, considering that even co-presidents Velja Ilic and Milan St. Protic couldnt function effectively, would have been unrealistic. Fortunately, neither of them suggested such an arrangement.