New conflicts between Serbs and Albanians are possible if the "interregnum" in northern Kosovo is not resolved. This is because there are still no indications of when elections for the municipalities with a majority Serbian population will be held, as assessed by sources from diplomatic circles. Its worth noting that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic called on Serbs from northern Kosovo and Metohija on Thursday to initiate early elections. In an interview with TV Prva, he said, "This is my plea to go to the elections as soon as possible, and in doing so, we initiate the process of consolidation to determine how and in what way the basic levers of power can be transferred into the hands of those who live there, away from those who have never lived there."

President of the Serbian List, Goran Rakic, the largest party of Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, supported by official Belgrade, stated a day later that this party is ready to participate in the extraordinary parliamentary elections in the municipalities in the North. The Kosovo government subsequently (in the evening) announced its support for holding these elections. Government spokesperson Perparim Kryeziu stated, "The Government does not call or organize elections, but it supports them." These statements should be seen primarily in the context of the announcement that envoys from the "Quint" (EU, US, France, Germany, and Italy) will visit Pristina and Belgrade on October 21. It is believed that the primary goal of their visit is to advance the implementation of the agreement on the path to normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

Nevertheless, the question remains whether the elections in the municipalities in northern Kosovo will indeed be called and when, and how to fill the kind of "interregnum" created at the end of last year, with the withdrawal of Serb representatives from all Pristina institutions. The recent increase in tensions shows that the decision to withdraw Serbian representatives from the Kosovo government, parliament, four municipalities in the north, as well as from the judicial and police authorities, was a mistake, even though it was a reaction to the statements of Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti that the Community of Serb Municipalities does not exist and that Serbs living in Kosovo will have to accept having Kosovo license plates on their cars.

From diplomatic circles, an unofficial claim can be heard that if the international EULEX mission does not fully assume responsibility for administration and KFOR for security in the North, the possibility of violence escalation should not be ruled out, similar to what happened in Banjska.

The explanation for this "temporary administration" to be established by EULEX and KFOR is that it would be in effect until conditions for normalizing relations between Belgrade and Pristina are established and new elections are held in northern Kosovo. The last round of the Brussels Dialogue, organized in mid-September, wholly exposed the fact that neither Pristina nor the Serbian List has the credibility or authority to establish a normal situation in the North. At the same time, diplomats warn that its questionable whether Vucic could control a further deepening of tensions, which, it is believed, would be "of even greater magnitude" than the tragic events recorded on September 24.

Some sources claim that opening new "hotspots" would be in favor of "geopolitical rivals of the West (especially Russia and China) " and that the conflicts would be "of such magnitude that even the Serbian army would be forced to react."

There are different views on whether the President of Serbia was "pre-informed" about what happened in Banjska - including assessments that "it is not possible for an attempted armed rebellion to be organized without the green light of official Belgrade" to statements that "Vucic may have been only informed," but the action was carried out without his blessing.

In any case, its clear that the escalation of violence did not serve the interests of the Serbian authorities, given that Vucic had received public praise for his constructive stance during the latest rounds of the Brussels Dialogue. Recall that the EUs chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, stated on September 14, after talks between Belgrade and Pristina mediated by the Union, that Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti did not accept the mediators proposal but "insisted on formalizing the de facto recognition (of Kosovo) as the first step," while Serbia wanted to begin the formation of the Community of Serb Municipalities (which is one of the basic postulates of the Brussels Agreement reached in 2013).

Although Vucic was criticized in the West for the Serbs leaving institutions in northern Kosovo, there was also some understanding for such a move, as Kurti steadfastly refused (and continues to refuse) to fulfill the obligation to establish the Community of Serb Municipalities. Moreover, there is consensus in the West that there can be no normalization of relations in Kosovo without some form of self-governance for Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church, which is provided for in all documents, from the famous "Ahtisaari Plan" to the current "Ohrid Agreement." Such a position of Belgrade has been significantly shaken after the events in Banjska, as evidenced by the views of some European lawmakers that sanctions against Serbia may be imposed in some form if the entire case is not clarified.

Milan Radoicic, the former vice president of the Serbian List, has publicly taken responsibility for what happened in Banjska. Vucic finds himself caught between pressure from the West to prosecute the suspects and his desire to avoid it, especially on "home turf" in Serbia, particularly during the upcoming election campaign, where he could risk his popularity by pursuing the trial of individuals some part of the public considers "Serbian heroes," "avengers," or "new Obilic" (referring to a legendary Serbian knight).

From the outset, the Serbian president has distanced himself from the armed conflicts in northern Kosovo but has not hidden his understanding of Radoicic. As he stated, "I dont want to defend him because he is accountable to the judicial authorities; an indictment will follow once the investigation is conducted and all the facts are established." He also added that "Radoicic had invested everything in his house."

Milan Radoicic, it is worth noting, was released on bail. Some Western diplomats unofficially suggest that, despite undeniable pressure on Vucic to conduct a comprehensive investigation into the shooting in northern Kosovo, the more realistic option may be that "everything gets lost in the legal labyrinth, under the pretext that there are no witnesses, that some suspects are unavailable, or do not admit guilt." In other words, the trial could drag on, similar to the process for the burning of the U.S. Embassy or the Bytyqi brothers murder case. One possible scenario is the assumption that "someone is convicted, like the police officer in the Savamala case."

It is not a coincidence that the President of Serbia addressed the foreign audience, primarily the American one, through CNN, especially in a prime-time slot, as this influential media outlet is known to be favorably inclined towards the current U.S. administration, making it a suitable channel for conveying messages that would reach the White House. The interview, conducted by renowned journalist Christiane Amanpour, is a continuation of Vucics media counteroffensive against the West that began a few days after the tragic events in northern Kosovo. This included statements to the British Financial Times and Spanish TVE.

The main goal of these appearances is to "mitigate the damage" caused by the escalation of tensions in northern Kosovo on September 24, explaining that the President of Serbia has no connection to the attack by an armed group of Serbs on the Kosovo police and that the perpetrators will be punished. In all of this, Vucics top priority is not to lose the support of Washington and Brussels because if the United States and the EU were to turn against him openly, it would undoubtedly jeopardize his hold on power.

The President of Serbia has largely based his domestic policy on populism, which included catering to the majority anti-Western public opinion, something he "built upon." However, this does not mean he followed the same direction in foreign policy. On the contrary, at a reception with U.S. President Joseph Biden during the UN General Assembly session, Vucic reaffirmed his commitment to further improving relations with the United States. After the armed conflicts in Kosovo and Metohija, he stated on RTS (Radio Television of Serbia) that Belgrade could achieve more in the dialogue with Pristina in discussions with the United States than with the EU.

Additionally, this year, the Serbian President met with Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky three times (at summits in Chisinau, Athens, and Granada), aligning with the policy of getting closer to the West, which supports Ukrainians in their fight to free their country from Russian invasion. There were also claims that Serbia was exporting weapons to Ukraine, which Vucic denied.

On the one hand, after the tragic events in Banjska, Vucic met with the Russian Ambassador, Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko, and this meeting was primarily intended for domestic consumption. Soon after, he also met with the ambassadors of the "Quint" countries (the U.S., the UK, Germany, France, and Italy), which had much greater practical significance, as evidenced by NATOs decision to deploy additional KFOR troops in Kosovo. Therefore, the question arises whether Vucics policy of substantive cooperation with the West in foreign affairs and the policy of fostering pro-Russian sentiment domestically have become unsustainable amid Russian aggression in Ukraine.

Undoubtedly, the unrest in Kosovo served Kurti perfectly to brand Belgrade as the main culprit for the situation, which the Kosovar Prime Minister referred to as "terrorism." Besides the significant damage caused to Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija and to Vucic himself, what happened seems traumatic and frustrating not only to the supporters of the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) and the right-wing but also to the pro-European opposition.

It is challenging to determine whether there is any blame for the "foreign factor" in the new circumstances, but it is evident that the unresolved Kosovo issue represents one of Russias leverage points in its relations with Serbia. Meanwhile, the deepening of tensions in Kosovo provides a welcome distraction for Moscow, at least temporarily, diverting global attention from the war in Ukraine. Therefore, if we were to talk about "winners," they would undoubtedly be Kurti and Russia.

Published on October 14th, 2023