How do you see the current situation in Kosovo? What, in your opinion, is the main problem that led to such tense relations? Could forming the Community of Serb Municipalities, as planned and agreed upon in the agreements between Belgrade and Pristina, have prevented such events?

The situation in Kosovo is best described as pivotal: it must go forward, with rapid progress, or the Kosovo question will become much more difficult to advance and resolve.

There is a main problem – one overarching problem that the US and EU don’t like to acknowledge – and there are immediate aggravating factors that we see after the 18 March Ohrid meeting in which “agreement” was declared by the EU and US.

The real reason for the continuing stand-off, can be explained in one word: leverage. I have repeatedly described this problem in articles and in a co-authored SAIS-Wilson Center report (‘From Crisis to Convergence.’)  Anyone who reads even the summary from that report can understand the obstacle.  Simply put, Serbia has no need to resolve the stand-off with Kosovo, because Kosovo cannot join NATO (or the EU) until the stand-off is resolved.

This is best understood without reference to the names of each country.  Let’s just call them ‘Party X’ and ‘Party Y.’  If five EU countries (and four NATO countries) say, ‘we won’t recognize Party Y until Party X does so’, well, Party X holds a massive advantage.  It has no incentive to recognize Party Y until Party X receives ‘compensation.’  Party X can maintain the status quo by doing nothing.

In my articles, I have repeatedly pointed out that, actually Party X – Serbia – is not just doing nothing when it comes to Kosovo. Under Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia pursues one very active strategic priority: the isolation of Kosovo.  Anyone who doesn’t understand this, needs only to listen to the words and watch the actions of three recent Foreign Minister-ships: Ivica Dacic; Nikola Selakovic; and Ivica Dacic again.  Blocking Kosovo from joining international organizations and even from sustaining bilateral organizations is almost an obsession.  It is the foundation of the relationship with Russia.  The isolation of Kosovo is a major component of the relationship with China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba and other countries.

Clearly, Kurti has been reckless in his operational moves in the north, defiant when it comes to the international community and provocative when it comes to his Kosovo Serb citizens.  It is not just arrests, but the treatment of Serbs who are arrested that deserves scrutiny.

Now let’s imagine that there were a more cooperative leader in Pristina.  In fact, we don’t have to imagine; there was a more cooperative leader.  His name was Avdullah Hoti.  In September, 2020 he even signed the Washington Agreement at the Trump White House, along with President Vucic.  At one point, he agreed to put the Association of Serb majority municipalities on the agenda.

So, what happened with this very cooperative, mild-mannered leader in Kosovo?  Did we see rapid progress between Belgrade and Pristina?  Reduction of tensions as each side focused on economic projects

No.  Very soon after the signing of the Washington Agreement, we saw some of the harshest attacks in years on Kosovo, led by two prominent figures around Vucic -- Aleksandar Vulin and Ivica Dacic.  Any reader who doesn’t know about their provocations in the wake of the Washington Agreement can simply check.

So, I come back to my main point – repeated in four different articles and reports.  There is a structural obstacle: the position of the four NATO non-recognizers (Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain.)  They supply the leverage to Serbia over Kosovo.  In so doing, they make it extremely difficult for Kosovo and Serbia to actually implement the ‘French-German Proposal’ or to do what is actually needed, reach a final settlement.

The current dynamics in the north are a reflection of this problem – and the longer tensions continue, the harder it will be to make progress.

There’s more to say, but this is enough for a short interview answer.  I will address the Association coming up.

The Franco-German plan has been agreed with all EU member states. If the plan is implemented, will the five EU countries change their minds about Kosovo?

There is no guarantee that this is the case, except in the likely case of Greece.  For Athens, implementation of the Ohrid Agreement (based on the Franco-German plan) and progress is quite important.  Cyprus can be left out of the conversation since it is not a member of NATO, and the breakthrough in the Serbia-Kosovo stand-off only requires the four NATO non-recognizers.  Unfortunately, the position of Romania, Slovakia and Spain is hyper-legalistic and formalistic.  Bucharest, Bratislava and Madrid do not say, ‘if only the parties would get along with each other, and if Kosovo would implement the Association, then we will change our mind.’  Their hesitation rests on other factors, most especially a dubious reading of international law. It remains an open question whether these countries would recognize Kosovo on the basis of Serbia’s de facto recognition.  This is precisely where concerted efforts from the Biden Administration need to be made.

Remember, Romania, Slovakia and Spain have completely ignored the 2010 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice.  This Opinion was brought by Serbia, when Vuk Jeremic was Foreign Minister.  Jeremic was totally confident that the Court would rule in favor of the claim.  The ICJ did the opposite, stating that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate either international law or UN Security Council Resolution 1244.  As I have repeatedly pointed out, Serbia does not challenge Kosovo’s sovereignty in the International Court of Justice.  Instead, Belgrade interferes with Pristina’s ability to establish diplomatic relations with other nations, and Kosovo’s effort to join international organization.

Belgrade seizes on the distinction between independence and sovereignty.  So, the entire region is held in suspense over a hair-splitting, legalistic distinction.  As I have written in SAIS Review, ‘the Kyiv-Kosovo Catalyst’, Ukraine’s recognition of Kosovo could change all this.  Instead of some faux legalistic prohibition, the non-recognizers would have to confront the facts – why Kosovo is a special case, a unique case.    

Regarding Association, you said that, in reality, granting the association for Kosovo Serbs—without advancing recognition of Kosovo by Serbs and by the full NATO alliance—is a fraught proposition. Can you explain in more detail – does it mean that, before forming ZSO, Belgrade and the four NATO members, should make considerable steps toward recognizing Kosovo’s independence?

I can explain this.  Yes, in 2013, Kosovo undertook an obligation with the Association.  In February, Kurti surprised Vucic by accepting this obligation.

But what is the nature of that obligation?  This is what is poorly understood.

In my recent article in Foreign Policy – ‘The United States in Creating a Kosovo Crisis’, I explained that autonomy is a final status issue.  I compared the situation to Ukraine.  Imagine that the US and EU ask President Zelensky to grant ethnic Russians autonomy in the Donbass and Crimea.  Zelensky is going to immediately ask those three questions noted in the opening paragraph of my FP article: will these ethnic Russians accept that they live in Ukraine, not Russia?  Will Russia recognize Kosovo?  And will the grant of autonomy finally allow ‘us’ (Ukraine) to join NATO?

Can you see how this applies to Kosovo and Serbia?  It is not clear whether the US and EU can guarantee Kosovo any of those fundamental points that Zelensky – or any leader would ask for in a similar situation.

I repeat: autonomy is a final status issue.  It is what a minority gets in exchange for giving up separatism – and it is typically the concession given to a neighboring irredentist state like Serbia, when Serbia gives up its own sovereignty claim.  

In this case, both Ukraine and Kosovo know that the only real guarantee they have of their sovereignty and territorial integrity is through NATO membership.  Not NATO protection through KFOR, but NATO membership, in Kosovo’s case.

Does this mean that Kosovo has no obligation to establish the Association?  Of course not.  Kosovo does have this obligation, stemming from 2013.  But the fact remains that autonomy is connected with final status.  The more ambiguity there is about Kosovo’s final status and Kosovo’s ability to join NATO, the more difficult it is to agree on the Association.

Here’s another way to look at it.  Imagine that Belgrade was prepared to recognize Kosovo.  Imagine President Vucic said, ‘my core priority is to ensure that Kosovo Serbs can fully participate as citizens in the Republic of Kosovo, and that Serbian patrimony is permanently protected.’  In that case, Kosovo Serbs would be able to negotiate far more than the Association, as the final settlement would be in sight.

But that’s not what Belgrade wants – and Moscow knows this.  As I wrote in the FP article, Russia supports the Association because they understand that it is a vehicle to project Serbian ambitions in Kosovo – not to protect Kosovo Serbs.

Kosovo Serbs are the unfortunate pawn in this power game. 

Our research and internal analyses notice the distance towards the West and the Franco-German plan. Still, with the change in the governments rhetoric, we also see the potential for the majority to accept the Franco-German plan as something that could be considered a compromise. But there is no way for normalization if Serbs do not get some degree of autonomy in Kosovo and the protection of cultural and historical monuments. We find that without autonomy, there is no medium or long-term normalization.  Escobar said in the hearing in Congress that, among other things, the key element is fulfilling Kosovos obligation from 2013 to establish a Community of Municipalities with a Serbian majority.

You are right.  The Association is essential in order to advance the Brussels-Ohrid Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo – and so is Serbia’s implementation of its own obligations, including to not block Kosovo in international organizations.  That’s why it’s essential for the EU and US to get Serbia and Kosovo to agree on an ironclad sequence of implementation of the Agreement.  Each side must have assurances that implementation will be reciprocated by the other party.

At this week’s hearing, Mr. Escobar said the opposite.  He said that each side should implement its obligations no matter what the other side does.  Does that sound realistic to you, not just for Kosovo and Serbia, but for any two countries – or even any two people?

You said there is an absurdity of sanctioning a democratic ally in Pristina while hailing a manipulative, pro-Russian autocrat in Belgrade. Does it mean that you believe there is not much blame for Mr. Kurti for this situation and that the US and the EU should not respond with measures to his refusal to meet their demands?

I already explained clearly three ways that Prime Minister Kurti shares blame.  What’s interesting is that Kurti is criticized harshly by Albanians for his approach to the US and EU, to the north, and even towards Kosovo Serbs.  Across the opposition – all parties plus much of the media and civil society – there is fury with Kurti not just for his divisiveness at home, but with his harshness towards Kosovo Serbs and his posture on the north.

In other words, politics in Kosovo is not a competition over who can be the toughest against Serbs.  To the contrary, the opposition accuses Kurti of unnecessarily alienating the US and EU over the north.  We can see in the inexcusable brawl in the Kosovo Parliament last week the intense animosity of the opposition.

The US and EU deserve blame for the situation by the way they have handled the dynamics for months.  The US and EU are quite harsh towards Kurti, but for months indulged Vucic on his own provocations.  This was on clear display in the violence on 29 May, with the attacks on KFOR soldiers using weapons and previously-prepared explosive devices.  Very sadly, a Hungarian KFOR soldier has lost his leg.

Yet in the wake of this violence, Vucic was praised as a partner and Kurti was the main target of the US, EU and NATO blame.  As I wrote in my recent FP article, yes, Kurti was an accessory to the violence – but Kosovo police and KFOR were the targets of that violence.

It was inexcusable that at Ohrid on 18 March – after allowing the parties to escape without signing the agreement, and without many key details and steps to implement the Agreement – that the EU and US did not at least get agreement for Kosovo Serbs to return to Kosovo institutions and to participate in new elections for Mayors in the north.  Elections for new Mayors are essential for Kosovo Serbs, including for ensuring their voice is heard prominently and consistently on the terms for the Association.

Brussels and Washington failed to take this critical – and achievable – step.  Everyone could see that a boycott by Kosovo Serbs would lead to a highly tenuous situation.  Yes, the blame for this latest crisis is shared by the negotiators as well.  This weak posture towards Belgrade goes back to the winter, and before.

Do you think the EUs three-point plan will be accepted?

Based on reports about meetings in Bratislava, and Kurti’s own announced partial withdrawal of police from the north, there appears to be some de-escalation, although short of the EU’s three-point plan.  Kurti is adamant over the violence on 29 May, and sees the issue as one of rule of law.  Of course, Kosovo Serbs also deserve rule of law, and respect.  And the opposition in Kosovo has faulted the Kosovo government on this.

As for eventual progress, I again note the fact that, because of the non-recognizers Serbia holds leverage in the negotiation.  This distorts everything, removing the incentive for Serbia to close the Kosovo question, unless Belgrade gets ‘compensation.’  And as long as the Kosovo question remains open, Belgrade has no incentive to finally decide its strategic orientation – West or something else.  That means that not only are Kosovo Serbs pawns – but all Serbian citizens are held hostage to this standoff.

You said that Blinken has apparently signed off on an understanding with Vucic (because of Serbia’s support for Ukraine). You also added that the Serbian-Russian relationship continues and that Blinken should urgently reexamine his administration’s approach. Do you think that the US approach that implies strategic patience towards Serbia is wrong and that it is bad to support “stabilocracy”? In your opinion, what mistakes did the US government make regarding this situation?

The Biden Administration came into office with a strong emphasis on democracy and ended up continuing the Trump Administration’s posture towards the anti-democratic Serbian regime led by President Vucic.  That is the main mistake.

This has been compounded by exaggerated bids to placate an autocratic President, Aleksandar Vucic – at the very moment when many Serbs are rising up, demanding respect for basic democratic norms.

It seems obvious where the US should be, but for some time.  There is no ‘stabilocracy’ with Vucic.  There is rising tension and disorder, and not only in Kosovo.  Look at the latest threats from Dodik in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Look at the fears and suspicions in Montenegro, which is a backdrop to the formation of the new government.

Look at Vucic’s reaction to the sanctions just imposed on Aleksandar Vulin.

So what kind of ‘trade-off’ are we talking about?

I can say that coincident with the publication of the recent Foreign Policy article (‘The United States is Creating a Kosovo Crisis’) that serious conversations appear to have been held at high levels in the US government.  I see some clear changes in tone following this.

I also believe the decision by the Biden Administration to sanction Vulin could be a watershed.  This could mark the long-overdue decision of the US to begin to hold President Vucic to account – over his domestic, regional and international policies.  Perhaps the FP article served as a catalyst to finally wake up to the fact that instability – not stability – was the result of the indulgent policy towards Vucic.

My hope is that Ambassador Hill – a very experienced diplomat – understands that meaningful progress in Serbian-American relations rests on accountability.  Allowing Vucic and his proxies like Vulin to be unaccountable is not the way to progress on policy over Russia, over Kosovo, over Serbian democracy, or other important matters in the Serbian-American relationship.  I think that US has more than demonstrated that it wants friendly relations with Serbia.  It’s now time to hold President Vucic accountable for his government’s obligations.

Are there divisions within the US government itself? Where exactly?

Yes, I believe there are divisions in the US government – and that they emerged over these recent weeks.  As noted, I’m hopeful that the sanctioning of Vulin is evidence that the divisions are closing – in the direction of holding Belgrade accountable.

I described some of the internal divisions clearly in my FP article.  I am hopeful that recent discussions and decisions in Washington are closing those divisions.  I am hopeful that high levels in Washington realize that the basis for Serbian-American cooperation is through accountability – not the opposite: allowing Vucic to sustain his charade of being a ‘Western partner.’

You said that instead of more "constructive ambiguity," the United States and the EU need to focus on clarity and an ironclad sequence of steps that Kosovo and Serbia need to take to implement the agreement well before the end of the year. Is it possible that the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement will continue when we see all these problems and obstacles?

Let’s not forget that Brussels and Washington managed to get President Vucic to agree, in principle, to the French-German proposal of de facto recognition – even if Vucic has undermined the agreement from the moment he refused to sign it.  And Brussels and Washington got Prime Minister Kurti to accept the Association, self-management, as a prior obligation of Kosovo.

So it is not as if the EU and US are totally helpless, without any ability to forge some kind of progress.

Fundamentally, this is about commitment and will.  How much does it really matter to the EU to advance this agreement?  How much are Borrell and Lajcak willing to invest to get the support they need in various, key EU capitals?  How much are President Biden, National Security Adviser Sulivan and Secretary of State Blinken willing to invest to get this agreement – this ironclad sequence of steps – agreed?

As I have written, Washington needs to understand that the Kosovo issue matters to the Kremlin – and to Vladimir Putin personally.  As my February article in SAIS Review explained, the Kosovo issue is a core element in Putin’s world view and his war narrative in Ukraine.  I argued in that article that Ukraine’s own recognition of Kosovo could be the catalyst for the NATO non-recognizers like Greece to change their position – bringing Romania, Slovakia and Spain along with them.

What do you think about the idea of holding an international conference on the issue of Kosovo?

Discussion of an international conference is a classic case of ‘putting the cart before the horse.’  As I just explained in the previous answer, the real question is whether the commitment and will exists in Washington and Brussels to see the existing agreement implemented.

An international conference can only work – only! – if there is strong will and commitment in Washington and key EU capitals.  Otherwise, the conference risks falling apart – which is what Putin would want to see.

You were in Zve?an, where you talked with representatives of the Serbs. What have you heard from them? Did you also speak with the representatives of the Serbian List? Mr. Vucic said there is a criminalization of Serbs, intimidation, and ethnic cleansing in the north of Kosovo, which the international community keeps silent. When you see how Serbs live in Kosovo, do you think Vucic’s statement is accurate, and to what extent?

I have a longstanding connection with Kosovo – and with Kosovo Serbs.  When I was Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, I consistently asked my staff to be proactive on concerns raised by Kosovo Serbs, and for OSCE to react to any abuses of their rights.  I am proud of this record.

Therefore, it was logical for me to visit the north, which I did upon invitation.  I am grateful for the valuable exchanges I had.  I am much more clear on the sensitivities and concerns of the Kosovo Serb population.  Along with others, I also met a group of Kosovo Serb representatives from the north in Washington.  It was clear already from my visit that the role of the Kosovo Special Police is a special source of anxiety and tension.

I am also proud to have known and collaborated with the late Oliver Ivanovic.  When (as number two in the OSCE Mission) I negotiated the breakthrough agreement in 2012 to hold Serbian national elections in Kosovo under OSCE auspices, Oliver was at first skeptical.  But he immediately saw the benefit of our approach, which was extremely difficult to negotiate.  I have publicly criticized Prime Minister Kurti for not continuing this successful model this year. 

I first met Oliver back in 1999-2000 when I was Deputy Mitrovica Administrator in UNMIK.  He was always open to constructive solutions and dialogue.  His murder was a great loss to the Kosovo Serb community, and to Kosovo at large.  That his murders are still free is also an abuse towards all Kosovo Serbs.