At a ceremony in Paris in November 2018 to mark the centenary of the end of World War I, there was a scandal when French protocol arranged for Kosovo President Hashim Thaci to sit right behind key participants in that war, while Serbian President Vu?i? was sidelined. There was also talk of deliberate provocation, although the then French ambassador to Belgrade, Frederic Mondoloni, apologized to President Vu?i? and the Serbian people for the protocol. If this year was a round date, and despite Banja Luka, we doubt that the French protocol would allow Kurti to sit in the place where he was in 2018. sat down, Thaci. This November at the Paris Peace Forum initiated by Macron and held since 2018. after meeting with the French President, Vu?i? continued the relative international consolidation after Banjska.
This does not mean that Vucic does not have a certain "memento" approach to the elections: he first determines how many of the electoral actors should receive a percentage in the elections. And then, as someone who knows in advance the distribution of percentages and mandates, he goes backwards (in reverse linear course) in order to align the reality with those set election results. It also uses the power of the party, state resources, the media junta and even the Falangist-Praetorian elements of coercion.
At a ceremony in Paris in November 2018 to mark the centenary of the end of World War I, there was a scandal when French protocol arranged for Kosovo President Hashim Thaci to sit right behind key participants in that war, while Serbian President Vu?i? was sidelined. There was also talk of deliberate provocation, although the then French ambassador to Belgrade, Frederic Mondoloni, apologized to President Vu?i? and the Serbian people for the protocol. If this year was a round date, and despite Banja Luka, we doubt that the French protocol would allow Kurti to sit in the place where he was in 2018. sat down, Thaci. This November at the Paris Peace Forum initiated by Macron and held since 2018. after meeting with the French President, Vu?i? continued the relative international consolidation after Banjska.
This does not mean that Vucic does not have a certain "memento" approach to the elections: he first determines how many of the electoral actors should receive a percentage in the elections. And then, as someone who knows in advance the distribution of percentages and mandates, he goes backwards (in reverse linear course) in order to align the reality with those set election results. It also uses the power of the party, state resources, the media junta and even the Falangist-Praetorian elements of coercion.
From Paris, Vucic arrived to Smederevo, and with the pre-election gathering of recognizable progressive aesthetics, in addition to the already existing "Smederevo Autumn" (a traditional tourist and economic event held in September every second weekend to celebrate the grapes and wines of the Smederevo vineyard), organized the political "Smederevo Autumn". With important messages. He almost said in an authoritarian way: "Go Away The Blind, here go the Smederevs”!
In Smederevo, Vucic said the most logical thing - that it is not possible for him to be the President of Serbia, and the Prime minister to be someone from the current opposition. Because what - in the event that the list he leads fails in the elections and is not the headquarters of the government-remains of his presidential legitimacy except as an empty shell. Because of the lack of legitimacy of the government, Vucic promised Djilas early Belgrade elections. Therefore, cohabitation is impossible at the Republican level. Because it would be formatting Vu?i? into a constitutional framework, which would realistically mean disempowerment, but also humiliation. Vucic would not agree to gradual dethronisation (degradation) as in the case of Milo Djukanovic, nor would he agree to simulate influence and rival some non-progressive Prime Minister with public appearances without real power. Vucic raised the scale of the elections in Smederevo, and formally declared them for a referendum on him as president. In a way, he blackmailed his voters, but even in this act with the ultimate performance, there were some doubts. It would not be possible to conclude that such a categorical position of Vucic also refers to the possibility of Ivica Dacic actually becoming Prime Minister, as the slogan dictates? Vucics new format of government would then entail drawing Socialists into a greater division of responsibility. And even the possibility of a new initialisation of something, such as Dacic in 2013 he initialled the Brussels agreement that enabled Vucic to develop Serbias economy for a decade and strengthen authoritarianism, i.e. personal authority.
Vucic said that he could not be president if, based on the results of the elections, he had to give a mandate to someone who "ruined Serbia", and that is probably not the leader of the Socialists. The scary, almost perverse, is the hypothetical possibility that Dacic will be Prime Minister in a government whose majority will be "Serbia against violence". As far as it can be heard in diplomatic sources "collective West" does not calculate that Kosovo is finally negotiated with the prime minister from the ranks of the current opposition. If the hypothetical government were made by pro-Brussels and pro-Putin opposition, what if the pro-Putin opposition sought the post of Prime Minister for support, which is logical for the immediate rejection of the Ohrid Agreement on Kosovo? And what would Serbias position then be in relation to the “collective West”?
Although there are no cold days yet, Vu?i? logically played in Smederevo without saying that to the advertisement for the stove "smederevac": when it comes to heating, one should not experiment. The faithfulness that persists. And so order the "smederevac". Otherwise, it will fail. Otherwise, the capillary strength of the Progressive Party on the ground in the pre-election days is really such that local households (voters) are able to provide both "smederevac" and a meter of wood.
And should we finally abandon the opposition mantra of a "technical government" of the pro-Western and pro-Russian opposition that would provide the conditions for fair democratic elections within at least six months? So these six months there is no negotiations on Kosovo or there is? Then these “fair elections” must be at the same time presidential because Vucic will resign after December 17th, he will have to give a mandate to the opposition candidate for Prime Minister. What do you think will happen in the next six months until the conditions for fair elections are met? Are you going to let them go so that they wont even be able to go to the “fair elections”? What will be the states response in the next six months? And what if the Progressives and Vucic still resist, survive and win the parliamentary “fair elections” in six months? And then the new democratic President of Serbia must cohabitate with Chancellor Vu?i?. A real, serious, "technical government" could only say one thing, and that is to quote Vucic – the next elections in 2017. At all levels, except for the presidential. Without Vucic.
In Smederevo, the only true progressive leader by default (I guess) said that the eventual introduction of a "third partner" (besides his and Dacics coalition) into the government would not imply a Prime Ministers position for that partner. Even if someone offered himself, like Djindjic offered himself to Milosevic after the 1993 election. And that refusal may be one of Milosevics biggest mistakes.
For the most part, those who have seen Christopher Nolans "Memento" (2000) have also seen what an all-genre neo-noir relationship to reality can be in an atmosphere of disorientation and identity crisis. The protagonist of the film Leonard has a reality that runs in a reverse linear course. Well, Vu?i? does not suffer from anterograde amnesia as the main hero of "Memento", although the media sometimes shows itself in stating which former regime is more responsible for what (the one from the nineties, or the one from the 2000s). This does not mean that Vucic does not have a certain "memento" approach to the elections: he first determines how many of the electoral actors should receive a percentage in the elections. And then, as someone who knows in advance the distribution of percentages and mandates, he goes backwards (in reverse linear course) in order to align the reality with those set election results. It also uses the power of the party, state resources, the media junta and even the Falangist-Praetorian elements of coercion. In a regime with this nature, elections are a necessary evil, and in a state where, even before Vucic, all power is essentially just executive power.
"Memento" and in politics as a metaphor means the same questions: What can we trust? Yourself? Facts? Your memory? Collages of illusions? (propaganda)? The true meaning of "memento" as an exclamation is: remember! Remember! Think about it! as a noun: a reminder, a reminder. Both Vucic and the opposition remind us.
Even those more versed Progressives in this "memento" cynically say that Vucic knows how to be “fair” in the preventive definition of election results. There are always some uncertainties: for example, whether he really projected that the Movement of Free Citizens, while its President was Sergej Trifunovic, would switch or not switch the three percent threshold in the 2020 elections.
After those elections, which were boycotted by most of the opposition, Dacic became the president of the "one-party" parliament. If only after December 17th, Dacic became the President of the Parliament, which would have an incomparably greater weight. And perhaps it would be more embarrassing for Vucic than for Dacic to become Prime Minister as the new/old slogan envisions. Dacics social intelligence, and even charm, instead of Orlics non-dialogical rigidity, for Vucics conception of Parliament as the necessary ballast of personal power, is a relatively subversive option. Vucic possesses and applies many governing techniques both in the party and in the state, but he is rigid and has no talent for one that Dacic, partly from his personal talent, partly from the genesis of the movement to which he belongs, has developed quite a lot, and that is - democratic centralism. This democratic centralism, as an old communist for simulating pluralism and rationalizing the inviolability of the party leader, was rather sensed by Da?i? and made him one of the factors of the constant regeneration of the SPS - the "Slavic left" clientelist type in which three key determinants of the Serbian political Being were synthesized -voluntarism, egalitarianism and statism.
Dacic’s trump card is that in the dowry to Vucic he brings by the best projection for the SPS eleven percent of the votes. For both Vucic and Dacic, the double-digit result of the SPS is a red line. For one plus, for the other minus. Since it is likely that even Progressive propagandists are tired of undermining the rating of the SPS through the “suitcase affair”, this time they played on an effective topic - media spitting of Dushan Bajatovic - and even more knowledgeable Progressives know that removing Bajatovic from the position of director of “Srbijagas” would be like imposing sanctions on Russia, and therefore these attacks should be understood as extremely conditional - in the short term.
It is very important what Demostats research has shown, which is that the votes of disappointed (often "unadulterated") SNS supporters do not go to the opposition but go to Dacic. Who is at the head of the SPS thanks to "democratic centralism" since Milosevic’s death in 2006, but with an indication that he had to compete for the presidential position in the party in a sharp (even democratic) fight with Milorad Vucelic, who is still one of the experienced politicians (ideologists) with whom Vucic is in a certain way fascinated. Despite the symbolic presence of Milosevic’s grandson Marko on the SPS list, the real heirs of Milosevic’s character and works are Vucic and his main ideologues. Although personal ones are not negligible either, the main reasons for Vucics neoradical phase are structural - systemic. Vucic realized in time that it would be fatal for his ambitions if the state had made a good privatisation of Telekom and sold it to a foreign partner. And such offers were still in the early stages of the progressive government. Today, Vucics list, if it played at the sports games of the political parties of Serbia (and in the romantic DOS times there were such games), could wear the “Telekom” advertisement on its jerseys. Just as parts of the opposition could carry the “SBB” advertisement. Today it is difficult to imagine such matches in small football, and I remember, for example, the match between the team of Daily Danas against the team of the Serbian Parliament, or the team of Danas against the “rest of the world” (diplomatic corps) where Nebojsa Covic played for Danas and Miroslav Lajcak played for the "rest of the world”.
In the election that was held a long time ago, SPS marketing strategists decided that the slogan “Ibar is the border” was too strong, and they gave it up. Perhaps for “Serbia on the edge" it would be effective today - almost Vucic’s symbolic slogan.
The older ones remember when the TV was in black and white. And the one that shuddered. Thats why there were so - called stabilizers-heavy-duty devices placed next to, or under the TV and on which our mothers and grandmothers put embroidered miles as well as on the TV sets. There was also a gondola from Venice on the TV, if there was one. However, there were also elegant stabilizers, such as the one "Iskra" made by "Tovarna radiskih spreemnikov" – Sezana from 1980. For any government, Dacic is just that-a stabilizer. Dont make the picture too tame. That is why the key question is whether the SPS will also have the strength to participate in bolder geopolitical denouement tomorrow. With the fact that today the SPS is very nonchalantly entering the elections lulled by its stabilizing unavailability. There are old phrases about patriotic politics and social justice, old flirting with Russia because you are acceptable to the West as the most desirable Russophiles (putinophiles) in Serbia. There is no longer any effort at SPS to make more avant-garde ideological-marketing moves in the campaign. For example, the 2018 election when the candidate for mayor of Belgrade of the SPS – JS list Aleksandar Antic spoke in London with the leaders of the city who expressed their readiness to support social and development programs of Belgrade, especially when it comes to public transport, social support and security of citizens. Antic spoke with London City Assembly Speaker Janet Arnold, city councillors and Labour members of Parliament who make up the majority in London.
This ideological aspect of Antics visit was not irrelevant: however, Labour left there, which meant (someone thought at the time) that after the debacle of the "modern Euro-left" making a deal with the DS, the SPS might tomorrow have the strength to unite the "modern left" again, but provided that it was not a pact with the "Democratic Union" that was projected by Boris Tadic in those days as a progressive substitute for the DS, and which, I bet, you forgot. It seems bizarre to you that this great and pompous idea of a "Democratic Union" has been reduced to a pre-election alliance with the so-called sovereigntist Sasa Radulovic.
Of course, there are also cynics who even then said, as they say now that I remind them of that episode, that the SPS and Antic can only be the “labour wing“ of the Progressives and nothing more. Dacic is much-needed politician, however, the times passed when it was not known who would be President, but it was known who would be Prime Minister.
And another bizarre digression: some Socialists I spoke to in 2018 they were pleased to hear that conservative British media reported, citing documents from Czechoslovak police, that then-Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn had a negative attitude towards the US during the Cold War and spied for the KGB.
The "proclamation" is an initiative by a group of concerned intellectuals with the aim of urging voters to turn out as many as possible in the upcoming elections. In essence, it is support for the opposition, pro-European-patriotic list "Serbia Against Violence". The "proclamation" initiative has so far given solid marketing and mobilizing effects, but it has shown something else: that it is much more natural, and in accordance with the pre - political state of this society-more optimal to divide Serbia politically through mobilizing lists of support, than through political parties and coalitions. Therefore, the most logical and natural would be that three main motivational lists of support go to the elections, and each of them already has a history of signing in previous initiatives: the first list would be a list of support for Aleksandar Vucic, the second list would be a "proclamation" (for the pro-European patriotic opposition) and the third list would be "we do not give Kosovo and we will not join the EU!"(for the pro-Russian patriotic opposition). There would be three realistic options on the ballot, avoiding pseudo-ideological fragmentation and games of detecting who really wants and what his last intentions are.
For the healing of Serbian multiparty, even without the current electoral pathology created by the regime, the formula is clear: the Turkish census and the Polish turnout: Erdogan lowered the census from ten percent to seven. In Serbia, it can be stepwise: five percent for one party, seven percent for a coalition of two parties and ten percent for a coalition of three or more parties or organizations. And Polands turnout of more than seventy percent, which President Andrzej Duda called a "gigantic turnout". Instead of pseudo-ideological coalitions, one would expect a real consolidation of the political scene by integrating the parties and reducing them to a reasonable number of relevant ones. Many senseless parties that create the illusion of pluralism would vanish. This tax reform is a missed opportunity for the upcoming elections.
Nor would it correspond to progressive strategies of thwarting alternatives by fragmenting them. To maintain the mass of amorphous activity.
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