The assertion that Serbia serves as exceptionally fertile ground for the activities, and even the successful proliferation and multiplication, of foreign influence through propaganda, disinformation campaigns, and the spread of fake news during these turbulent geopolitical times is well-founded. This becomes evident when mapping foreign influence in our media landscape over just the past two and a half years, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
Nearly all national broadcasting frequencies, which are public assets owned by the citizens of this country, funded through the state budget, and supported by subscription fees paid by the citizens, serve as the primary channel for (pro-)Russian propaganda in Serbia. Specifically, most of these outlets are being misused to advance the propaganda of a foreign nation. This phenomenon sets Serbia apart from all other European countries, with the sole exception of Belarus.
National frequencies are incomparably more effective in executing these activities than any Russian state-owned media operating in our region.
The assertion that Serbia serves as exceptionally fertile ground for the activities, and even the successful proliferation and multiplication, of foreign influence through propaganda, disinformation campaigns, and the spread of fake news during these turbulent geopolitical times is well-founded. This becomes evident when mapping foreign influence in our media landscape over just the past two and a half years, since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
Nearly all national broadcasting frequencies, which are public assets owned by the citizens of this country, funded through the state budget, and supported by subscription fees paid by the citizens, serve as the primary channel for (pro-)Russian propaganda in Serbia. Specifically, most of these outlets are being misused to advance the propaganda of a foreign nation. This phenomenon sets Serbia apart from all other European countries, with the sole exception of Belarus.
National frequencies are incomparably more effective in executing these activities than any Russian state-owned media operating in our region.
The most significant examples of foreign propaganda influence in Serbia can be observed in the disinformation spread about the war in Ukraine, the protests and their participants over the past two and a half years, the concealed agendas of local tabloids caused by the chronic lack of media pluralism, and campaigns targeting journalists and media workers. Behind all of this lies a clear signature: Russia.
The anatomy of Russian influence in Serbia’s information and media space is highly complex. Russian state-owned media serve as a prime example of how media can be exploited as a propaganda tool by third countries. Despite the European Union’s recommendations to impose sanctions on Russia, including in Serbia’s media and information space, Russian state media—directly funded and controlled by the Kremlin—continue to operate in Serbia. These outlets not only spread campaigns that align with Kremlin interests but also influence public opinion in neighboring regions such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (specifically Republika Srpska) and Montenegro, thus extending the disinformation campaigns regionally.
The very existence of the Russian state television outlet Russia Today (RT) in the Serbian language through the portal RT Balkan has long been a problematic and contentious issue. The European Union sanctioned RT as early as March 2022. Despite this, no significant changes have occurred since, prompting Reporters Without Borders to appeal once again to the EU to hold Serbia accountable for allowing RT’s operations.
However, while Russian state media continue their activities in Serbia, their direct influence on the Serbian media landscape remains relatively small compared to the overwhelming presence of pro-Russian propaganda on Serbia’s national broadcasting frequencies.
The most dominant and creative pro-Russian propaganda campaigns are found, ironically, on Serbian national broadcasting frequencies. These frequencies—public assets owned by Serbian citizens, funded by the national budget, and sustained through subscription fees—serve as the primary channels for disseminating pro-Russian narratives.
The extent to which nearly all national broadcasting frequencies are misused for the purposes of foreign propaganda is unique to Serbia, with the sole exception of Belarus in Europe. National frequencies are far more effective in executing these campaigns than any Russian state-owned media operating in Serbia.
A striking example of this was observed during the U.S. election coverage on a Serbian national broadcaster, where RT programming with Serbian subtitles was aired, followed by studio commentary during prime-time slots between 8 PM and 10 PM. The blatant nature of this pro-Russian propaganda raises the question of whether it can even be classified as "propaganda" anymore.
While some national broadcasters exhibit overtly pro-Russian propaganda, Serbia’s public broadcaster, Radio Television of Serbia (RTS), presents a more sophisticated version. According to a two-year qualitative monitoring study conducted by Demostat, RTS’s news programming subtly favors Russia, avoiding outright propaganda or hate speech but demonstrating clear bias. For example, its news reports feature affirmative coverage of Moscow, while RTS journalists only sporadically use the term "aggression" when discussing the war in Ukraine, favoring narratives aligned with the Russian perspective.
This sophisticated propaganda extends beyond news programming to RTS’s cultural and educational shows. Russian series, films aired during prime-time hours, and historical themes focusing on Russia during World War II reinforce these narratives. Even travel shows like Fantastic Planet subtly depict the West as decadent, contrasting it with an unblemished portrayal of Russia and its allies.
The normalization of these narratives, directly dictated by a foreign power, has become widely accepted in Serbian society. German news agency dpa and its former Southeast Europe head, Thomas Brey, have called the situation alarming, emphasizing the effort to discredit the West while aligning Serbia closer to Russia. Similarly, Peter Stano, the EU’s foreign affairs and security spokesperson, has warned of Russia’s systematic attempts to sow political instability, discontent, and disinformation.
In the digital age, social media has become a central battleground for foreign influence. Platforms like Telegram play a significant role in spreading Russian propaganda through disinformation networks. This is exemplified by operations like "Portal Combat," a Russian disinformation campaign aimed at creating and distributing Kremlin-approved narratives via a network of websites, many of which bear the ironic name pravda (justice or truth in Russian).
These websites, supported by bot networks, amplify their content across social media, particularly on Telegram. Demostat’s analysis highlights how quickly and effectively these networks disseminate narratives, with Telegram channels tied to this operation reaching a combined audience of over 15.7 million and generating nearly 100 million daily views.
The Digital Sphere: A Battleground for National Security
France’s VIGINUM agency, tasked with monitoring and countering foreign digital influence, uncovered critical details about the "Portal Combat" operation. Managed by the Russian company TigerWeb, based in Crimea, this operation is part of a broader network aligned with Kremlin interests. VIGINUM identified operational similarities between TigerWeb and another sanctioned Russian network, Inforos, concluding that TigerWeb serves as a service provider for Russian influence operators.
Using Telegram, Russia targets public opinion in countries with societal and political tensions, often exploiting sensitive topics such as migration to incite division and undermine trust in democratic institutions. This strategy poses a particular threat to countries with already fragile political systems, contributing to xenophobia, racism, and instability.
In summary, Russian propaganda exploits nearly all national broadcasting frequencies to shape public opinion, destabilize political systems, influence perceptions on key geopolitical issues, and dictate societal trends. Such pervasive foreign influence undermines democratic processes and poses long-term threats to Serbia’s stability and security.
Addressing this challenge requires continuous efforts to raise public awareness about the dangers of disinformation and to strengthen the capacity of political and social institutions to counter and prevent foreign interference. Until then, the question remains: How long will Serbian citizens continue paying to be misinformed?
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